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Introduction
What accounts for the stability and popularity of the Putin regime in Russia? Given the authoritarian turn during the Putin era, this question has already attracted attention in popular as well as scholarly debates in Russia and in the West. As scholars stressing the strength of the Middle Eastern regimes prior to the Arab Spring or of the communist countries in the early 1980s have realised, it is easy to overstate authoritarian stability and popularity, not least given electoral manipulation as well as restrictions on the media (Schedler 2002) . While this makes it difficult to assess just how large the support for the Putin regime is -and how easily it might unravel in the face of freer media and honest and competitive election campaigns, there is considerable evidence to suggest high support for the government and the president in particular (Frye et al. 2016) .
Given the robust democratic awakening in the late 1980s/early 1990s, many observers predicted that Russia would develop into a Western-style democracy. Therefore, the popularity of the authoritarian turn under Putin is puzzling. It seems clear that Russia's political system offers limited scope for popular input, as elections are not free and fair and competition in the political realm is limited. This has even led some analysts to speak of a 'Sovietization of Russian politics' (Kryshtanovskaya and White 2005) This article evaluates two theoretical approaches to the resilience of authoritarianism in Russia, namely political culture and social contract theory. These are two of the most influential approaches to Russian politics and reflect the divide in comparative and postcommunist politics between political-cultural and rationalist explanations (Whitefield and Evans 1999; Eckstein 1988) . As both theories are quite abstract and hard to test, we seek to operationalise them by demonstrating how they are bound up with different notions of legitimacy (for a summary, see Table 1 ). This is an important concept for understanding political stability in Russia (Sil and Chen 2004) . The starting point of the concept of legitimacy is the justification of power through the pursuit of the common good of society.
This distinguishes the legitimate exercise of power from merely effective exercise of power.
In other words, legitimacy is a form of generalised support and trust in existing political institutions that does not exclusively depend on personal advantage or securing specific gains. It is based on values that benefit the community as a whole both in a material and ethical sense.
The political culture approach is bound up with traditional and charismatic forms of authority and legitimacy that are often seen to be rooted in Russian history and culture (Pipes 2004; Hedlund 2005) . This approach implies that Russian support for authoritarianism might be quite stable and even unconditional, as the prevailing political culture predisposes people towards favouring strong authoritarian leadership and against democratic governance. From this perspective, neither the democratic reversal nor the popularity of authoritarianism is surprising.
The second approach, based on social contract theory, has been advanced by some Russian scholars (Auzan 2009; Makarkin 2011) and implies that Russians are less uncritical in their assessment of Putin's rule than some Western observers suggest. Russian support for the Putin regime amounts to a form of "conditional tolerance" (Pakulski 1986 ) -i.e., Russians are willing to give up free elections (and renounce on demands for "input legitimacy") if the regime delivers its part of the bargain in terms of good economic outcomes (i.e., "output legitimacy" is satisfied).
This article suggests that both explanations are incomplete. The first explanation, emphasising political culture, overstates the depth of support for the Putin regime.
1 Given that cultural factors are relatively durable and change only slowly, this explanation struggles to address why support for democracy has varied over time -notably, why it was quite high in the early 1990s and why there have been some fluctuations in the support for key democratic processes, such as the direct election of governors (Makarkin 2011 (Makarkin , 1468 . In other words, this would confirm that Russians are not inherently undemocratic, as also shown by Colton and McFaul (2002) . While there is some evidence in support of the social contract explanation, i.e. the idea that the support for the authoritarian turn is contextual (initially prompted by the perception of chaos in the 1990s) and fuelled by the perception of good regime performance in terms of economic growth, it is relatively hard to distinguish between the political culture and social contract approaches in the period 1999-2007. Both approaches predict high support for the regime at that time, but during the economic crisis the predictions of the two approaches diverge. We show that the social contract approach cannot fully explain the support for the political regime during the global economic crisis when economic performance deteriorated.
We develop an alternative framework that bridges these approaches and extends them in important ways. First, as both research on the Soviet Union and on contemporary Russia has shown that the stability of social contracts cannot be taken for granted, we suggest that social contracts must be understood in dynamic terms and that we need to focus on the ways in which social contracts are maintained and renegotiated over time. Second, we integrate insights from scholarship on political culture to suggest that culture should not be understood as a rigid structural constraint, but that it can also serve as a resource which political leaders can draw on for political legitimation strategies. As Swidler (1986) has shown, culture can be understood as a toolkit or repertoire of symbols, stories and worldviews that actors can use to construct strategies of action. We argue that support for the Putin regime can be understood as a social contract, but that the regime has been able to redefine the terms of the contract, notably during the economic crisis, when oil prices and economic growth have fallen. By raising the salience of national security and nationalism as key performance indicators, assessments of the regime in terms of performance have remained favourable. The significance of these appeals resonates with a political cultural approach.
The article is structured in the following way. The next section outlines the approaches to authoritarian stability in Russia based on political culture and social contract theory. It shows how these approaches imply different forms of political legitimacy, and it discusses the alternative framework proposed in this article, which builds on these approaches. The following sections evaluate these approaches by examining empirical data.
As we were not able to run our own survey to test these hypotheses, we use descriptive statistics from survey data to illustrate relevant developments in state-society relations in Russia. The final section concludes with some general lessons from this analysis about the stability of the Putin regime and authoritarian resilience more generally.
Political Culture and Social Contract Theory
Political culture has long been an important approach to political science and political sociology, though its influence on academic debates has fluctuated. Sidney Verba, an influential contributor to the literature on political culture, has stated that "The political culture of a society consists of the system of empirical beliefs, expressive symbols and values which defines the situation in which political action takes place. It provides the subjective orientation to politics." (Verba 1965, 513) . In Lucian Pye's definition political culture "encompasses both the political ideals and the operating norms of a polity.... [It] is thus the manifestation in aggregate form of the psychological and subjective dimensions of politics" (Pye 1968, 218) . There are different ways of studying political culture (Wilson 2000) , but all of them analyse the ways in which beliefs and understandings of politics vary across countries and shape political systems and behaviour.
The concept of political culture has been influential in scholarship on Russia (Brown 1985; Whitefield 2005) . For example, Richard Pipes develops an argument about Russian political culture and attitudes towards democracy premised on the idea that "Russia is a remarkably conservative nation whose mentality and behavior change slowly, if at all, over time, regardless of the regime in power" (Pipes 2004; 9) . Many scholars who adopt a political culture approach to Russian politics stress the country's distinctive historical traditions and political history, including norms related to the mir system, the philosophical concept of sobornost' (Biryukov and Sergeyev 1993) and étatisme (Tucker 1992) , all of which creates a strong sense of path dependence in values and political developments (Hedlund 2005 Some Western scholars have been sceptical of applying this approach to the study of Russia (Colton and McFaul 2002) , not least since cultural explanations are often quite deterministic and poorly equipped to explain processes of change (Hall 1986, 8-9; Holmes 2015 ). However, it should be noted that the political culture approach remains influential in Russia (e.g., Biryukov and Sergeyev 1993) . overstated the passivity, fear and manipulation of the population, not just in the case of dissidents, but also in the population at large, where cynicism, questioning and different forms of active and passive resistance were possible. As this suggested that significant parts of the Russian population tolerated and even accepted at least some aspects of communist rule and that this was not just induced by fear, the social contract approach was proposed as an alternative framework for understanding communist rule. For example, Linda Cook's influential work identified a "tacit social contract" between the Soviet regime under Brezhnev and its working class: "According to the terms of the contract, the regime provided full and secure employment, egalitarian wage policies and lax performance pressures in industry, state-controlled and heavily subsidised retail prices for essential goods and socialised human services (i.e. education, medical care, child care etc.)" (Cook 1992, 37) . Cook suggests that this contract acted as a severe constraint on the regime, which had to deliver key outcomes or "lose legitimacy among workers and risk open discontent". Stephen White also identifies economic performance as the most important legitimation strategy of communist regimes and suggests that the trade-off between economic welfare and lack of participation can be interpreted as a form of social contract (White 1986, 463 ).
Hauslohner (1987) offers a more complex definition of the social contract as a set of norms, or "implicit conventions which have been widely accepted by the public and the elite as expected and fair rules of the economic game". Like Cook (1992) , Hauslohner (1987, 59-60) identifies blue collar workers as the main beneficiaries of the Soviet social contract, and he stresses the importance of institutionalisation, notably the centrality of institutions like the Labour Ministry, which implemented and defended associated policies over time.
More recently, scholars have explored the notion of a social contract in postcommunist Russia (Cook and Dimitrov 2017; Greene 2012) . For example, Wegren (2003) has examined the transformation of the social contract in rural Russia, and Holmes (2001) has suggested that there was a social contract between the political and economic elites in the 1990s that was detrimental to society at large. Cook and Dimitrov (2017) show that social welfare provision plays a more limited role in the social contract of post-communist Russia than in the Soviet Union. Others have analysed the applicability of social contract thinking to Soviet and post-Soviet workers (Ashwin 1998) . There is also an alternative approach to social contract theory in Russia based on input legitimacy. Such studies generally conclude that there has never been a social contract between Russian rulers and society (e.g. Alexei
Levinson in Chechel' and Markov 2015) .
There has also been considerable interest in the social contract in Russia in recent years. Dmitry Medvedev referred to the importance of having a social contract in some of his speeches as prime minister of Russia (Sakwa 2008, 894) . In 2000 the independent NGO National Project Institute "Social Contract" was established. It is directed by the Economics Professor Alexander Auzan, and this organisation has actively contributed to debates and sponsored publications about the social contract and its importance to Russia. Auzan (2009) views the social contract as increasingly important and even indispensable in contemporary Russia.
Similarly, Makarkin defines a social contract as a bargain, where the population accepts the regime, provided the state is able to "guarantee a reasonable quality of life for the majority of the population". Makarkin (2011 Makarkin ( , 1467 suggests that such a contract existed for much of the Soviet period, when the bargain entailed stability in exchange for loyalty. Auzan (2009, 24) states that the social contract "is an exchange of expectations concerning rights and freedoms and it is rarely formally expressed. A social contract regulates informal rules at a very high level." 3 The Russian scholars' analysis suggests that one of the main problems of Russia in the 1990s was the lack of a social contract or any broad-based agreement (e.g.
Bogayevskaya et al. 2001). Given the unstable economic situation and the first war in
Chechnya, people remained highly politicised and distrustful of the authorities, hence welcoming direct elections of governors and single-member constituencies as a way of manifesting discontent with the authorities (Makarkin 2011 ).
Makarkin suggests that the social contract was re-established under Putin when people saw that wages and pensions were being paid on a more regular basis and the state as capable of restoring "order". According to Auzan (2009) , Russian citizens agreed to a deal with the authorities in which they exchange "stability [in the country] for political freedoms".
The shock of the economic transition in the 1990s that left most Russians in a tragic economic situation and the "low demand for democracy" from citizens (Auzan 2009) contributed to the new arrangement of state-society relations after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Economic performance became the sole basis for citizens' evaluations of the authorities due to the hardship caused by the abrupt transition from a centrally planned economy to a market-based system and of the continuing shortcomings in establishing democratic mechanisms and institutions strengthening social control over the political system. In summary, Russian scholars view the social contract -a set of informal rules and an exchange of expectations as part of an implicit bargain between society and the authoritiesas an essential basis for legitimacy and effective modernisation of the country. Its importance is underscored by concerns that there may be instability if the authorities are unable to renew the social contract under changing circumstances (Auzan 2009 if the social contract view is accurate, then stability is less certain and conditional on the authorities delivering their part of the bargain.
-- Table 1 around here--
We show that neither of these perspectives can provide a complete account of the high support for the Putin regime. Therefore, this article also develops a third approach, which draws on elements of both theories but extends them in important ways. First, this approach conceptualises the social contract in dynamic terms. As noted by Auzan (2009) and Makarkin (2011) , the stability of social contracts cannot be taken for granted. Rather than viewing it as a stable bargain ensuring both conditional tolerance and regime legitimacy, we need to focus on the ways in which social contracts are maintained and renegotiated over time and the legitimation strategies the regime uses to accomplish this. If the terms of the agreement change over time, then the importance of specific performance indicators to assessing output legitimacy can also change. Secondly, we draw on a more nuanced account of political culture, which is not merely understood as a structural constraint, but also as a resource which political leaders can draw on for political legitimation strategies. Political leaders have various tools at their disposal, including strategic agenda-setting, framing of policy issues as well as attempts to increase the salience of some issues at the expense of others. This relates to Riker's concept of 'heresthetics' as the dynamic manipulation of conditions of choice (Riker 1984 ). This may include a variety of administrative resources, which are likely to be particularly important in authoritarian and hybrid regimes. In addition, the degree to which such a legitimation strategy resonates with the public and becomes embedded in a social contract or a set of norms specifying popular and elite expectations from the regime, may be related to political culture. In the empirical part of this article, we argue that the Putin regime has been able to redefine the terms of the Russian contract during the economic crisis, by raising the salience of national security and nationalism as key performance indicators during the period when oil prices and economic growth fell. This has ensured that assessments of the regime remained favourable despite deteriorating economic performance, which had been a central plank of the social contract under Putin before 2008 (Auzan 2009 ).
Empirical assessment

Political Culture: Traditionalism and Charismatic Leadership
Scholars, such as Richard Pipes (2004) , have argued that Russians have a strong cultural preference for authoritarian rule and that they do not value democracy, which is viewed as a weak political system. Other scholars have found that regime support in Russia is based on paternalistic ideas, which prevail not only among the rulers but among Russians in general (Gudkov et al. 2001, 18) . Their study found that Russians tend to hold traditional views about the ruler as a father-figure, who "needs to support order in society and secure known minimum of consumer goods and social guarantees". Citizens do not believe they have an active role. Key reasons for this include the rulers' unwillingness to cede control over society and the inability to imagine alternative arrangements (Gudkov et al. 2001) . protests against the monetisation law in January 2005, which replaced free services (such as public transport) with cash payments (Robertson 2011, 176) . New consolidated data on protest activity in Russia (Lankina 2015) show that political protests were the most common form of protest in 2007-2012. Civic protests (protests about legal, cultural, and environmental issues) are the second most frequent type of protests in this period (Lankina 2015, 38 (Holmes 2015, 51) .
Social Contract
It seems clear that Russia does not have a social contract based primarily on input legitimacy, There is some empirical evidence of a social contract based on conditional tolerance.
For example, a large section of the Russian population is willing to give up some of their freedoms if they can expect a "normal salary and reasonable pension" from the state. To the extent that the social contract is based on the idea that the government should deliver outcomes perceived to further the common good, it can be seen as related to output legitimacy. According to Gilley's guidelines, we can talk of legitimacy when a citizen supports the regime "because it is doing well in creating jobs" and not when a citizen simply supports the regimes "because I have a job" (Gilley 2006, 502) . If people give priority to economic factors, it is very difficult to discern whether they are concerned with their personal well-being or with the common good. This difficulty holds also in the case of Russia. If regime support is based on an assessment of general performance, we could speak of output legitimacy as understood by Gilley. In practice, it is hard to distinguish this empirically from Table 2 ; Gaddy and Ickes 2010). In 2014-2015, the Russian economy suffered again due to falling oil prices and financial sanctions imposed on Russia. It is difficult to estimate independent effects of these financial factors, but available evidence suggests that the impact of the sanctions on the GDP and Russian currency was significant, albeit not as great as that of the the oil price shock (Dreger et al. 2016) . In mid-2014 Russia fell into recession, and this Rising prices were mentioned as the biggest concern by 82 % of Russians in February 2015
and by 69 % in February 2017, heading the list of the most pressing issues in Russian society, and followed by poverty, increasing unemployment, and economic crisis (Levada Centre 2017a).
-- Table 2 How can we explain the high support despite worsening economic conditions, which might be expected to undermine the social contract? We suggest that the continued support for the regime can be explained with the third approach -a dynamic account of the social contract, which implies that the contract can be broadened or reshaped by de-emphasising one type of output (delivery of material well-being) and emphasising another (protection of the national values). By adopting a legitimation strategy stressing nationalist ideas, understood as both protection of traditional Russian values and defending Russia from enemies, especially in the context of the annexation of Crimea, the regime has reduced the salience of economic issues.
According to data from various Russian public opinion centres, after 2010, satisfaction with the direction in which the country is developing is connected with assessments of leadership and largely disconnected from economic well-being (Greene 2012, 136-137) . In conclusion, while there is some evidence to suggest that regime approval fell after the economic crisis, support quickly rebounded and even increased. The volatility of approval suggests that support is not unconditional. We argue that support has been maintained by renegotiating the social contract and by increasing the salience of nationalism as a key performance indicator for assessing output legitimacy in Russia.
Conclusions: Stability, Social Contract, and Legitimation Strategies
This article has discussed political culture and social contract theory and shown that these theories cannot fully account for Russian regime stability. Many traditional political culture explanations overstate the stability of support for the Putin regime. On the other hand, while economic performance generally correlates with support for the regime, the lack of substantial social upheaval during the economic crisis suggests that there are other important bases for the stability of the regime. We suggest that this outcome can be explained through the lens of a dynamic social contract -where previously assessments of the economic situation mattered most, this contract was transformed by increasing the salience of nationalism. This implies that the authorities can reshape the terms of the contract and broaden it, by making alternative 'outputs' more salient in people's assessment of the regime.
This involves making more extensive use of legitimation strategies that draw on nationalism and ideas that resonate with traditional political culture. This suggests that the social contract between the political authorities and Russian citizens incorporates other dimensions and that it could no longer be sustained purely on the grounds of economic performance. This is also underpinned by Putin's leadership, which capitalises on nationalist sentiments of Russian citizens. The convincing narrative of Putin's rule, initially in terms of economic modernisation and strengthening of the state (Sakwa 2008 ) and more recently as a guardian of the national interest, so far compensates for negative evaluations of virtually all state institutions and for actual economic problems. There are three broader implications of this analysis.
First, this article relates to the growing literature investigating how political authorities use various legitimation strategies to convince citizens that they are rightly in position of power (e.g., Holbig & Gilley, 2010; Mazepus et al., 2016; Von Soest & Grauvogel, 2016) . We have shown how political culture and social contract theory are bound up with different notions of legitimacy and how these theories could be integrated within one framework. Although these theories have generally developed independently of one another, this article suggests that legitimacy, social contract theory and political culture can be fruitfully combined.
Second, this suggests the potential for bridging rationalist and political culture-based accounts of comparative politics. Greater attention to cultural variables could address an important shortcoming of rationalist approaches, namely the lack of attention to processes of preference formation (Hall 2005) . Legitimation strategies are not always successful. To the extent that elite strategies have contributed to a reformulation of the social contract in Russia and laid the foundation for stable support for the regime, our argument implies that the resonance of the adopted legitimation strategies with political culture may be an important reason for their success. This would imply that there is some potential for reshaping social contracts, but that such contracts are not infinitely malleable. Successful legitimation strategies that reshape perceived legitimacy and contribute to a stable social contract are likely to be those that are well aligned with prevailing cultural scripts and social preferences.
Other comparative studies analysing the use of different legitimation strategies could shed light on the degree to which the success of such strategies varies across cultural contexts.
Moreover, they could investigate to what extent nationalism (authorities' emphasis on security of their people and safeguarding particular values of their nation from destructive international factors) is a common element of the existing social contracts in nondemocracies and how it contributes to their stability. 4 Finally, while our analysis suggests that social contracts underpinning regime stability can be adjusted to reflect changing circumstances, the long-term prospects of the Russian social contract remain uncertain. It is easy to overstate the degree of authoritarian stability and not clear whether the support for the regime can be sustained if the economic problems that Russia has been experiencing due in part to the lower oil prices and counter-sanctions imposed on the West seriously affect the well-being of citizens. The lack of upheaval could suggest that the consequences of the economic crisis were until now not sufficiently severe to bring about greater resistance. If the economic situation were to deteriorate further, then it is not clear whether alternative legitimation strategies would work. A comparison with the Middle East may also be instructive here. Many scholars have used the idea of a social contract to explain state-society relations in the Middle East (e.g., Losman 2010) and suggested that especially natural resource abundant countries offer a favourable bargain to their populations, by which they distribute resource rents in exchange for regime support. As the Arab Spring illustrates, this does not necessarily guarantee the stability of authoritarianism. On the other hand, some regimes in the most resource-abundant countries in the Middle East have been quite robust, which might indicate that economic performance related to oil and gas prices could continue to have an important effect on Russian regime developments as well. As shown by Gerschewski (2013) , the stability of authoritarian and hybrid regimes tends to depend on three pillars -co-optation, repression and legitimacy. In practice, economic performance will have an important impact on output legitimacy and the regime's ability to co-opt strategic groups. It remains to be seen whether appeals to nationalism will provide a sufficiently strong foundation for regime stability and constitute a durable social contract in the longer term if robust economic growth does not resume.
2. Many influential thinkers in the history of Western political thought, from Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau to John Rawls and various contemporary theorists, have viewed the social contract as an essential part of their theories of politics (Waldron 1994 , Rosenfeld 1984 , Rawls 1971 . While there are interesting parallels between Russian approaches and social contract tradition in Western thought, we do not consider these questions here (but see Shlapentokh 2003). 3. It should be noted that this social contract does not necessarily presuppose democracy in Russian writings, at least not as conventionally defined in the West (Makarkin 2011 (Makarkin , 1470 . Makarkin suggests that Russians tend to view democracy as a system benefiting the people in socio-economic terms (hence, according to Makarkin, they view both Russia and Belarus as more democratic than an economically struggling albeit politically more open Ukraine). 4 There are some affinities between classical Hobbesian accounts of the social contract 'as a means of creating a power capable of holding war at bay' (Forsyth 1994, 42) and the logic of such nationalist legitimation strategies. 
